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The concept of governmentality was developed by Michel Foucault to address the 
specificity of contemporary neo-liberal forms of governance – premised on the active 
consent and subjugation of subjects, rather than their oppression, domination or 
external control. These neo-liberal forms of governance are evident in new forms of 
Alliance contracting in the construction industry. Project management has been a 
historically evolving field: we review the major innovations in organization form in 
the sector, before considering the specific management practices of surveillance and 
control typically associated with governance in these projects. The paper reports on 
an example of governmentality applied to the practice of project management. While 
governmentality refers to the design of project governance as an activity, the 
management of projects as a mode of organization, irrespective of the mode of 
governance, is highly complex and uncertain. These themes have been widely 
addressed in organization theory and we draw on recent treatments of them that 
combine transaction costs and resource dependence perspectives. Moreover, we argue 
that projects also display an acute sense of temporality as Schutzian influenced 
approaches have explored. Complexity, uncertainty and temporality are addressed in 
the context of governmentality in a specific and highly innovative project 
management. 
The research methods used in the ethnography are spelt out, as well as the methods 
used in constructing the interpretation of the case. Economies in authoritative 
surveillance have been sought through building collaborative commitment and 
transparency into the moral fibre of a project. The governmental tools used to do this 
are a strong project culture, monetised key performance indicators, and a stakeholder 
conception of the project, to bind different organizational stakeholders together. The 
case does not record an unqualifiedly successful project: the governmentality that was 
constructed had limits, as the case spells out. The failure indicates some issues that 
the stakeholder theory of the firm will need to address. We conclude that 
governmentality projects premised on stakeholder conceptions are particularly 
susceptible to discrepancies between ambition and outcome. In such a context the 
constant injunction to improve may itself be an integral part of the governmental 
method. Hence, governmentality is particularly appropriate for understanding quality 
management issues. 
 











That power is embedded in the overall authoritative structure and design of 
organizations is rarely addressed compared with the attention that has been paid to 
deviations from this order (Hardy and Clegg, 1996). Thus, the “problem of order” 
(Hobbes, 1651), is largely unacknowledged in Organization Theory (but see Wolin, 
1960). Hobbes’ contractual solution to the problem of social order, that authoritative 
images of the social order are encapsulated in the notion of an implicit “contract” is 
still routinely practised in at least one arena of organizational life – large-scale project 
organization. 
  
Large-scale projects are constituted by contract. Typically, these contracts have been 
predicated on a climate of mistrust: anticipating that agents will transact with guile, 
contractors wrote contracts as watertight as possible. Contractual enforcement is 
enforced through governance mechanisms that involve high degrees of surveillance of 
work to check that it is completed in accord with the contract (Lundin and 
Soderhölm, 1998; Charue-Duboc and Midler, 1998).  
 
The practices of contractual surveillance – as opposed to an emphasis on the 
principles involved (as in transaction cost economics: see Williamson, 1975) – 
involve complex practices of power (Clegg 1989; 1995; Clegg, 2000; Hardy and 
Clegg, 1996: 375). Despite Jermier’s (1998: 236) warning that ‘it would be 
impossible . . .[today] . . . to explain what separates critical theory’s various 
traditions’, Foucauldian perspectives are often incorporated within traditions of 
‘critical’ organization theory (for overviews, see Burrell’s [1988] introductory 
account as well as the papers collected in Starkey and McKinlay, [1998]). Foucault 
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was initially assimilated to “critical” organization theory through an emphasis on 
close surveillance and control of individuals (Dandeker 1990; Marks, 2000). 
Recently, this has been enriched by organizational work on surveillance, (Sewell and 
Wilkinson, 1992; Knights and Vurdubakis, 1993; Sewell, 1998), discipline 
(Covaleski, Dirsmith, Heian, and Samuel, 1998), as well as forms of language 
(Oakes, Townley, and Cooper, 1998). However, these papers have drawn only 
selectively from Foucault’s writings.  As these developed after the English 
publication of Discipline and Punish the objective of control came to be seen not 
simply as an end in itself (or a means to greater exploitation as earlier labour process 
theorists had mostly seen it). Instead, management was seen to want to normalize the 
psyche of sub-ordinates such that self-supervision became reflexive.  For the latter 
condition, that of reflexive self-control, where there are no necessary external sources 
of surveillance, Foucault coined the term governmentality.  The theorists who come 
closest to capturing this sense of control through self-surveillance were Sewell (1998) 
and Barker (1993) with their emphasis on the normative work of teams.  Surprisingly, 
however, neither theorist connected their work to Foucault’s theme of 
governmentality. 
 
Foucault introduced the term governmentality in a series of lectures that he gave at 
the College de France on the ‘Birth of Biopolitics’ in 1979 (Marks, 2000, 128). These 
lectures engaged with the changing face of liberalism as a political project in the 
Reagan and Thatcher administrations. For Foucault governmentality meant both 
strategies of organizational governance, in a broad sense, as well as self-governance 
by those who are made subjects of organizational governance. The concept of 
governmentality sought to capture new liberal approaches to political management. 
 3 
 
The focus was on ‘the totality of practices, by which one can constitute, define, 
organize, instrumentalize the strategies which individuals in their liberty can have in 
regard to each other’ (Foucault, 1988, 20). As du Gay (2000a: 168) suggests, 
governmentality ‘create[s] a distance between the decisions of formal political 
institutions and other social actors, conceive[s] of these actors as subjects of 
responsibility, autonomy and choice, and seek[s] to act upon them through shaping 
and utilising their freedom.’ What is novel about liberal forms of governance is that 
the personal projects and ambitions of individual actors become enmeshed with, and 
form alliances with, those of organization authorities and dominant organizations. 
 
A number of writers have written about these later aspects of Foucault (see especially 
Szakolczai, 1998: 258 and Clegg, 2000). However, with the exception of du Gay 
(2000b), Jackson and Carter (1998), and van Krieken (1996), they do not explicitly 
address organizational issues (eg: Hunter 1993; Miller 1994; Burchell, Gordon, and 
Miller, 1991). As the governmental concept is quite close to some aspects of 
organization theory this is surprising. In particular, the practice of governmentality 
aspires to create a common sensemaking frame (Peters and Waterman, 1982; Weick, 
1995; Colville, Waterman, and Weick, 1999) or, as a recent political theorist posits, a 
common “practical consciousness” (Haugaard, 2000). In Jackson and Carter’s (1998) 
terms, governmentality means that ‘people should voluntarily and willingly, delegate 
their moral autonomy and moral responsibility to obedience to the rules, to being 
governed in their conduct by a ‘moral’ force . . .which is external to the ‘self’.”  As 
they go on to note, the requirement for obedience ‘usually is rationalized and justified 
in terms of a greater collective interest’ (Jackson and Carter, 1998: 51). Or, as 
Townley (1998: 193) suggests, ‘before a domain can be governed or managed it must 
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first be rendered knowable in a particular way.’ Our concern is with this knowability 
as a shared property of organizing, a practical collective consciousness of those doing 
the organizing. 
 
For traditional organizations the achievement of a practical collective consciousness, in 
which sensemaking is shared, has been seen as problematic (Clegg, 1994). It is even 
more problematic in some new form organizational designs, such as alliances or project-
based organizations, where there is no unitary centre of control. Successful completion 
of multi-organizational projects rarely involves a very high degree of coherence, unity of 
purpose and project – even at the management level (Flyvbjerg, 1998).  Conflict, 
ambiguity and lack of common purpose have been much more evident, as past research 
has demonstrated (Higgin, Jessop, Bryant, Luckman, and Stringer, 1966; Clegg 1975). 
In these organizational arrangements, despite the recourse to contractual tightness and 
strict surveillance, control has been extremely difficult to achieve (Stinchcombe, 1985: 
25-27). Even when these projections take the shape of rational action, the anticipation of 
future action remains… ‘quite vague and indeterminate compared to the real thing when 
it finally occurs’ (Schutz, 1967: 59).  
 
Phenomenologically, what is projected in a project is an ‘action’ which ‘is the execution 
of a projected act’ such that ‘the meaning of any action is its corresponding projected 
act’ (Schutz, 1967: 61). Large-scale construction projects are unique arenas in which 
highly complex, uncertain and creative projects have to be realised (Hartman, 1998: 81). 
Following Schutz (1967), the organization of a multiplicity of actors, with a multiplicity 
of interests, entails that a realistic grasp of the problematic meaning of that which is 
being projected must start from the actor’s definitions of a project (also see Weick, 
Comment [FoB1]: This is 




1969: 167). Typically, these are encoded as different ‘modes of rationality’ (Clegg, 
1975), constructed at the intersection of professional disciplinary knowledge with 
contractual codes. It is changes in the latter that are of most significance, not only for 
organization researchers, but also for disciplinary practitioners. While disciplinary 
knowledge changes gradually codes of contractual control have been subject to quite 
dramatic shifts. 
 
Changing Codes of Contract in Construction 
Historically, construction projects were delivered under the control of just two 
parties. The architects were responsible for the design and the contractors for the 
construction.  The two phases followed each other and required services were 
delivered by integrated organizations that employed all the people needed within each 
particular phase. Specialization provided the basis of increased efficiency in a 
Taylorist model of production. As projects became larger, services more complex, 
and materials and techniques more varied, specialization and fragmentation emerged 
for other reasons.  Fragmentation helped to distribute the financial risks in an 
inherently cyclical industry as well as the industrial relations risks arising from the 
large workforce on individual projects. Also, as larger work-packages became 
divided, more highly specialized workers delivered each smaller work-package. 
These smaller groups had less work and consequently less work flexibility on each 
site, hence they had to move from site to site, balancing the demands of several sites 
simultaneously.  
 
A fragmented process posed difficulties in terms of controlling the outcomes 
delivered by increasingly disparate project teams.  The divide between the two phases 
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of design and construction imposed barriers to the optimization of the entire delivery 
process, extended the project life and hence the time-related risks, as well as 
generating conflict from the pervasive ambiguity (Higgin et al, 1965) of highly 
indexical (Clegg, 1975) contractual documents. It became the paradox of traditional 
construction project management that third-party enforcement through the contractual 
form, as a dominant mode of project rationality, generated many of the issues it was 
designed to minimize and manage.  
 
In order to overcome the limitations of what had become an increasingly fragmented 
and risk-laden process, “Design and Construct” was introduced to create a single 
point of responsibility between the client and the principal contractor.  The 
management of conflicting costs/risks during construction, however, still had an 
impact upon the business viability of the constructor as well as upon the life cycle 
costs. Increasingly, especially as the privatization of public works developed, Design 
and Construct became the dominant method of contract.  
 
Under Design and Construct, project managers sought to organize transactions 
through the market.  However, it was a managed market. It was managed because of 
conditions of bounded rationality, especially as it evolved through time, and because 
a high degree of uncertainty attached to the fragmentary and complex nature of the 
many organizational resources required in constructing a building or piece of 
infrastructure. The main tools of management were process analysis, cost and 
schedule planning, and legally binding contracts. The incidence of conflict and 
ambiguity remained high, in part because complex contractual documents and the 
scope of the bill of works were always open to multiple interpretations. Also, there 
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was the potential for conflict between the short-term interests of the contractor and 
the long-term interests of the client and end users. Although these contracts sought to 
bind agreements and minimize differences, typically they became the source of 
differences (Clegg, 1975; 1992).  
 
Over the past 15 years there has been a move to “BOOT” (Build-Own-Operate-
Transfer) arrangements on some infrastructure projects. While this arrangement 
changes the focus of the contractor from an almost exclusive interest in short-term 
construction issues to a whole-of-life focus, the contractual arrangements within the 
supply chain remained fragmented and largely the same as under Design and 
Construct arrangements. Potential for conflict between the client and the contractor is 
reduced as interests are aligned through focussing on whole-of-life efficiency of the 
facility.  
 
More recently, some infrastructure and some BOOT schemes have been delivered by 
joint venture. The rationale is that it is rare that any one company has all the skills to 
deliver a total project through to completion and further on into maintenance and 
operation of a facility. Thus, a BOOT scheme may involve a hotel operator, a 
constructor, and a developer who all come together to assemble a complex product in 
space and through time on terms still dominated by the third-party enforcement of 
agreements. An integrated BOOT organization internalises the design, construction 
and, in some instances, the operation of a facility into one vertically integrated and 
unified project. It subsumes market to hierarchy, in transaction cost terms, seeing the 
solution to contractual disputation generated from self-interest as a shift to 




Transaction costs analysis has a particular affinity with discussion of contracts. 
However, its approach of either market or hierarchy does not necessarily work well 
where project duration is typically longer than that of any transaction in a market and 
shorter than that of any formal organizational hierarchy. Managing a complex 
construction project through the market is virtually impossible: too many 
transactions, in too complementary a relationship, with too many interdependencies, 
make the market model unsatisfactory for anything other than the simplest or most 
routine projects. 
 
In BOOT schemes hierarchy works reasonably well for those projects that are high in 
complexity and low in uncertainty, where it can usually be translated into top-down 
management style marked by a strong tendency to risk aversion. However, many 
large projects are characterised by a high degree of uncertainty, as well as a mixture 
of joint organization and sub-contracting of elements of the workflow to legally 
separate organizations, which, together, make for a high degree of complexity. These 
are not ideal conditions for hierarchical control but they are appropriate for inter-
organizational collaboration, as some recent contributors to transaction costs debates 
appreciate (Dyer and Singh, 1998).  
 
A relational view of the sources of competitive advantage that attach to organizations 
using a strategy of inter-organizational collaboration has been developed in the 
literature, drawing in part on the transaction costs tradition as well as from the 
resource-based view of the firm. As Dyer and Singh (1998: 661) put it, ‘[r]ecent 
studies suggest that productivity gains in the value chain are possible when trading 
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partners are willing to make relation-specific investments and combine resources in 
unique ways.’ They refer to these combinations as idiosyncratic interfirm linkages 
that may return “relational rents” – that is, exceptional returns over and above normal 
or “business-as-usual” expectations. In the construction industry such idiosyncrasy is 
referred to as “alliancing”.  
 
The competitive advantages of alliancing are numerous. First, investments can be 
made in assets specific to the alliance rather than diffuse to the joint-venture partners. 
Second, there are opportunities for substantial knowledge exchange, including the 
exchange of knowledge that results in joint learning. Third, there is opportunity to 
combine complementary but scarce resources or capabilities, which result in the joint 
creation of unique new products, services or technologies. Fourth, theorists have 
pointed to alliancing having lower transaction costs than more traditional projects, 
owing to more effective governance mechanisms (Dyer and Singh, 1998: 662). 
Finally, the form explicitly acknowledges the centrality of uncertainty and 
complexity, rather than attempting to resolve it through a detailed contract that can 
usually be shown to be insufficiently detailed enough. Relational rents will thus be 
achieved either through more effective governance mechanisms that lower transaction 
costs or through the synergistic combination of complementary, but scarce, resources 
or capabilities. Governance issues cut across all the latter factors, assets, knowledge 
or capabilities, as suggested by Dyer and Singh (1998: 669). 
 
The Case Study and its Methodologies 
Research was undertaken in a project-based collaboration that will be referred to as 
the O-Team. The setting for this study was a large infrastructure construction project 
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in Sydney, conducted by an alliance between a public sector body and three private 
sector contractors. Data was collected during early 1999 until the end of 2000 using 
semi-structured and open-ended questionnaires with over 30 employees across 
several levels of the O-Team, as well as key individuals in the community and 
government.  Interviews lasted between one and a half and five hours. All members 
of the top leadership team were interviewed in depth and all interviews were taped 
and subsequently transcribed.  Additionally, the O-team held monthly, and later bi-
monthly, leadership team meetings almost all of which were attended by a researcher. 
Typically these meetings lasted between eight to twelve hours and involved managing 
directors, chief executive officers, and executive managers of all collaborating 
organizations. While permission to tape record meetings was denied for these 
meetings, the researchers were able to use a lap top computer to transcribe 
proceedings. 
 
Field study observations, using photography of the research sites, field diaries, and 
informal discussions were also used to record an often neglected and rich source of 
data – that of artifacts. Gagliardi (1990: 3; also see 1996: 565-566) so aptly describes 
the importance of including the analysis of artifacts in organizations. He defines 
artifacts as products of human action which exist independently of its creator; as 
intentional in that they aim to solve a problem or satisfy needs and as ‘perceived by 
the senses’ in that they come inherently constituted through their own corporality or 
physicality. Indeed, when used in conjunction with other research tools, such as 
interviews and surveys, we believe the study of artifacts to be ideal in the study of 
governmentality. If a specific conception of governmentality is to become a material 
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practice it is best operationalised in artifacts of human existence that mark out our 
mutual obligations. 
 
The social dynamics of organizational collaboration became the central focus of a 
mode of data collection based on open, interpretative collection of ethnographic data. 
We employed crosschecks between interpretations of observed events for the 
employees concerned as well as with other employee interpretations. The research 
setting was treated as a naturally occurring experiment to develop theory from case 
analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
 
The transcribed interviews and the ethnographic notes were initially analyzed using 
open coding techniques (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) to try and uncover the dominant 
modes of rationality: the structural deep framing of many discourses in coherent 
ways.  Key themes for this analysis became the project culture and its relationship to 
a set of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) of Schedule, Budget, Occupational Health 
and Safety, Community, and Ecology. A team of researchers received intensive 
training in open coding and worked independently of each other.  Coders analyzed 
over 1,000 pages of transcripts. The O-Team culture referred to the artifacts, as well 
as principles and philosophy espoused by the leadership team and evident in banners, 
glossy photography, and clearly visible mission and vision statements. It was also 
evident in the rich descriptive information provided in the interviews.  
 
In seeking to make sense of the O-Team culture we elected to follow Catherine 
Casey’s (1996) conception of a “Designer Culture”, because it seemed to capture the 
situation as we interpreted it.  For her, a designer culture has the following 
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characteristics (adapted to a project situation). First, it would be characterised by 
individual enthusiasm manifesting values of dedication, loyalty, self-sacrifice and 
passion for the project, seen in correct language forms, appropriate interpersonal 
interactions, and the service of long hours at work. Second, there would be a strong 
customer focus – where the customer is not just the end-users but also employees and 
other significant stakeholders in the project. Third, discourse would be characterised 
by a familial language of team and family. Finally, there would be public display of 
the designer culture. We found that these terms described the O-Team perfectly. 
 
For KPIs coders searched for words or phrases containing the five KPIs of Budget, 
Schedule, Community, Occupational Health and Safety, and Ecology. This included 
variations of each KPI. For instance, ecology might occur as environment, 
environmentally friendly, pollution, pollute, oil spill and so on.  Similarly, schedule 
might also appear in other forms such as in time, on time, deadline. Community often 
appeared as the word “they”, but also appeared as stakeholders, people out there, and 
so on.  After independently coding text, research team meetings were held and 
similarities and differences in coding were discussed.  
 
Analysis and Discussion: from Governance to Governmentality 
Typically, construction arenas were characterised by multiple and conflicting modes 
of professional rationality, policed by a complex system of on-site surveillance, off-
site litigation and arbitration. Because contract design rarely achieved contractual 
order the terms needed policing. In the past policing was characterized by a 
correspondence model of the representation of contractual design structure. What was 
expected was that the final outcome of any project should correspond to the project 
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design. However, in accomplishing any project, several parties to the contract have to 
interpret the contractual documents.  It is rare that they would do so from anything 
other than different positions of interest, hence the need for surveillance, arbitration 
and litigation intended to achieve ‘goodness of fit’ between design conception and 
project execution. (Architecturally, the governance model was large-scale Taylorism 
in the assumption of its conception/execution dynamics.)  The contemporary shift is 
to a coherence model being agreed governmentally between the parties to the design. 
Thus, one can think of these as a practical, rather than an epistemological, philosophy 
(McHugh, 1971). 
 
Governmentality poses an alternative to policing, litigation and arbitration, especially 
in situations of multiple actors and interests, through the design of a more collective 
and coherent practical consciousness within which to make sense. Literally, it seeks 
to make conflicting modes of rationality redundant by delivering economies in 
authoritative surveillance through building a collaborative commitment and 
transparency into the moral fibre of a project.   It seeks to constitute each self-
interested actor, both individually and organizationally, in such a way that they have 
something to gain from greater collaboration within the project. It does so by tying 
individual and organizational bonuses to performance on transparent indicators in 
such a way as to seek to ensure that no trade-off between them takes place.  Indeed, 
performance becomes translated into performativity – an awareness of always being 
on view, on stage, on show, in not only what one does but also how one does it. 
Constituting performativity is the function of transparency, because the more 
transparent one can make the actual performance of different expert’s knowledge and 
actors the fewer opportunities can arise for them to exert professional prerogative in 
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power games around the detailed interpretation of contracts. To achieve liberal forms 
of governmentality one would first have to abolish more authoritative governance 
structures premised on correspondence and substitute ones premised on a more 
coherence model. 
 
At the core of the project team’s strategy was a contractual commitment to build a 
projected infrastructure. However, while the time for completion was strictly 
stipulated at the outset – it was to be ready for the Sydney 2000 Olympics – it was the 
only variable so stipulated: even the price was not stipulated at the outset. The project 
team sought explicitly to develop a coherent mode of rationality through a strategy of 
what we, analytically, refer to as governmentality. They would say that they used a 
specific set of principles, embedded in a strong “alliance culture”, to try and achieve 
excellent outcomes. An executive team managed the O-Team; however, power was 
seemingly devolved, authority decentralised, participation encouraged, and lower-
order employees were empowered. The project was designed in such a way as to try 
and deliver the project below budget, within time, with benefit to all stakeholders. 
The mechanism for achieving this was a risk/reward system that specified the scale of 
risks and benefits that would accrue to the alliance partners. It was related to 
performance on the KPIs, negotiated as part of the initial contractual agreement. In 
the risk/reward scheme adopted by what we will refer to as the O-Team, the costs and 
schedule were negotiated at the outset, with an agreement that they would not be 
renegotiated during the project. All staff on the project, from directors to contractors, 
received training through induction workshops to understand these KPIs. It was 
through the common motivation and mode of rationality afforded by commitment to 
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these KPIs that the O-Team believed that it could deliver added values – which Dyer 
and Singh (1998) refer to as relational rents. 
 
Indicators or benchmarks of each of the KPIs for non-cost objectives were initially 
developed by the project as clearly defined standards for performance (poor to 
outstanding).  Independent experts were commissioned by the client to verify, modify 
and amend the benchmarks initially proposed by the O-Team. These independent 
experts continue to carry out independent audits of performance against the defined 
benchmarks in each non-cost objective. They then provide the O-Team with a report 
and a progress score. This score determined the level of reward or penalty in 
accordance with the agreed risk/reward formula. 
 
In this project there were positive and negative financial outcomes for performance 
on each of the objectives in the risk/reward process. Financial rewards were payable 
on a sliding scale for performance above “Business as Usual” (BAU) to 
“Outstanding”. All objectives, except cost, had a maximum amount. Financial 
penalties accrued when performance was below BAU and performance in any one 
area could not be traded-off against any other area that represented by the KPIs. Only 
outstanding performance against all five KPIs would yield the maximum return; less 
than this in any one area would diminish that return and adverse performance would 
see the return risked as penalty clauses began to bite. 
 
In the head offices for the project there was a highly acute and visible commitment to 
the KPIs. Banners hung from the rafters of an open plan office in which all the 
alliance partners were collocated, declaring the formal rhetoric of the alliance 
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principles, nine in all, of which a “no-blame” culture is the bedrock. The ultimate 
values were expressed in the phrase “Whatever is best for project”.  Around the open-
plan offices and corridors the trend lines for the KPIs were visibly displayed, kanban-
style. It was the public display that initially alerted us to the specificity of this project 
as an example of a designer culture. For instance, when one walked in to the HQ, the 
first thing one saw was a large tank of water, absolutely clear, with rocks, vegetation, 
and fish swimming in it.  These fish, mute but pervasive monitors of the ecology, 
represented the ultimate customers of a project oriented towards improving harbour 
water quality.  The large-scale representation was a very big tank and contained some 
quite large fish that caught the eye as one walked in.  It was directly in front of 
one the reception desk was off to the side.  It was illuminated so as to make more 
manifest the spectacle of the clear water, the bubbling aeration, and the graceful fish, 
serenely swimming in pure water.  Once one walked past the fish, one could either 
turn left into the Project Offices proper, or right into a labyrinth of small rooms. One 
of these was a staff kitchen, the walls of which were decorated with stories cut out of 
the local and metropolitan press about the project: some stories were favourable, 
others not.  Notices were posted about forthcoming social and training events. 
Elsewhere, charts mapped the progress of the project on the KPIs.  Trend lines and 
bar charts displayed indicative performance in terms of desired outcomes, as well as 
“business-as-usual” projections and demonstrated progress. The main office was a 
large open-plan working space, with many cubicles, surrounded by offices and 
meeting rooms that hugged the four walls.   
 
The construction professionals gathered in the offices displayed considerable 
awareness of the values of the alliance culture.  The reasons for this were evident: the 
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banners were very visible; also, one alliance partner was a consultancy that 
specialised in designing organization cultures for extraordinary performance and the 
Project Director was a man who clearly recognised the value of cultural artifacts in 
framing the project. At the heart of the consultancy practice was the insight that 
management involves system and individual dynamics that imply objective as well as 
subjective factors.  Often, they suggested, it was only the most apparent aspects of the 
culture that was managed – the individual behavioural and organizationally systemic 
aspects.  What tended to be neglected were the intentional, individual aspects and the 
cultural, group aspects: it was precisely these areas that had to be most explicitly 
managed for successful outcomes, they suggested. Hence the governmental focus that 
they had adopted lead naturally to a concern not only with organization design but 
also cultural design: the two were seen as inherently and reciprocally intertwined. 
They sought to recruit people to the project on a set of specific cultural criteria 
oriented towards teamwork, creativity and sociability; having recruited them 
according to an explicit model of the culture that they had designed, the incentive 
structure was structured to reinforce the culture they designed.  
 
The mode of governmentality and its culture were explicitly oriented to aligning 
business objectives, generating mutual incentives, sharing risks, pooling strengths and 
building trust. The banners were its visible manifestation.  Its tacit manifestations 
were no less evident: they were to be seen in the commitment to achieving mutually 
beneficial outcomes – the positive monetisation of the KPIs. The KPIs, in terms of 
orienting members to extraordinary performance outcomes, sought to make more 
probable that a co-operative and collaborative culture would be a rational 
manifestation of the O-Team principles. This finding was consistent throughout all 
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interviews and the following are just a handful of examples from a wide range of 
organizational members, from managing executives through to union representatives. 
Project Leader 1: The quality of this project is in our commitment to the KPIs. Commitment to 
working together. The “what's best for project” culture. Culture. Togetherness. Really what's best 
for project. (07.27.1999). 
 
Construction Site Manager: Quite frankly, I don’t want to be biased but the culture is working.  I 
had doubts when we started but we bring four different groups working in a sort of set concept of 
how to approach this project.  Everybody had certain doubts but we said, look, put our doubts 
aside, think positive, and hope for the best.  That’s where we are.  Also, we said we agree that there 
will be times that we will not agree, I’m not sure that we did agree on every issue at every time but 
we did agree to align on all issues. Align means basically, I don’t exactly agree with what’s being 
proposed because I have my reasons, but I will not oppose (02.02.1999). 
 
Community Relations Manager: Everybody has to have the same objectives, working towards the 
same goals. It wont be good of two of the companies are only interested in profit and schedule and 
not environment or community. So the sharing of objectives, the setting up of the KPIs. 
(07.27.1999) 
 
Union Representative: I'll be frank with you; we have some pockets of staff resisting [our] culture, 
no doubt. But the critical mass is well and truly there. The critical mass is there. The momentum is 
there. The small pockets of resistance that may exist will start to roll into the culture as it 
proliferates. Or they will leave. We have a huge project, 400 odd million dollars, hundreds of staff, 
there is no doubt you will get some pockets of resistance. But we are also constantly working to 
address issues as they arise…the resistance is dissipating. It really is…we are committed to the 
community, to the environment and all the rest (07.27.1999) 
 
Indeed, even in the face of vigorous opposition from the community and some areas 
of government, the belief in the O-Team culture and the validity of the KPIs was 
undying, as reflected in the words of the project director and project manager: 
Project Director: So you see this [community resistance] is having an impact upon the project and 
our ability to deliver it. It involves a commitment that is unparalleled in any other project. We don’t 
want our people to go away scarred because of the experiences. This is great project, it has been a 
great project and it must be recognized. It is a success! 
 
Project leader: I have to say that [the client organization] recognizes the strength of this alliance 
arrangement and without this alliance arrangement we would have struggled to manage the project. 
We should applaud that and acknowledge it. (08.15.2000). 
 
The emphasis on culture clearly signifies the importance of meshing the personal 
projects and ambitions of the individual actors involved in the project with those of 
the alliance (Casey, 1996: 321). The incorporation of green symbolism, such as the 
banner posters whose slogans were superimposed on images of a sparkling harbour 
and its beaches, together with the iconography of the fish, were all devices used to 
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create a focus on the project outcomes as inexorably tied up with the project process. 
The project process was the focus of a governmental ethos that tightly coupled day-
to-day organizational behaviour with the distribution of a potentially surplus value 
attainable only by the disciplined, self-reflexive and imaginative effort of all parties 
to the contract. With the O-Team culture: 
[I]t’s a whole different ball game, whole different culture. What we did was in simple terms two 
things. Our approach was that we were not going to try and inject something that meant alliancing 
and quality that was totally radical, even though it is. This is because it would seem to be another 
level of performance, um, be another layer, or another tick I must put in the box. So what we did 
was [management] restructured them [employees decision making meeting] in subtle but very 
important ways. Subtle so it did not feel like it was such a big deal. Again it was a low-key 
approach. And we restructured the delegates committees to broaden them, to inject the right level 
of management to give the right level of commitment (Leadership Team Member, 07.27.1999). 
 
The project had a significant impact on some of the most expensive and desirable real 
estate in Sydney. The communities that the O-Team had to deal with were densely 
networked and politically sophisticated. While in the longer term the project was 
inestimably to the benefit of these residents because it would improve the quality of a 
major amenity, there were some communities where its impact was less immediately 
beneficial.  Some aspect of the above ground works had an immediate impact on 
amenities, either in the short or the longer term.  
 
As part of its management of the community impact the O-Team had implemented a 
community consultation strategy, with a community liaison officer leading the 
strategy in a number of local areas.  This was an attempt to take governmentality out 
of the project team and into the community. In many areas this was enormously 
successful, leading to positive community relations and even some improvements in 
design.  In the short term, however, a number of communities had to suffer the impact 




The nature of the O-Team project involved the construction of a large venting stack, 
which was the cause of community management problems for the O-Team.  Initially, 
the Environmental Impact Statement (the EIS) had suggested that there were to be 
two venting stacks constructed: ongoing redesign limited this to one larger vent, 
sitting on a larger tunnel, due to redesign as a result of geo-technical and machinery 
issues.  The residents of the area in which it was to be built, with considerable local 
political support, opposed the decision to build the tunnel vents as well as its location 
and design.  Intense local struggles ensued, played out in the media, Council 
Chambers, Community Consultation Committees, correspondence, and direct action. 
Technical assurances were provided by the O-Team that the activated carbon 
scrubbers would filter the odours by up to 95% but the technical rationality of the 
engineers and the practical, local, rationalities of the residents seem irrevocably 
opposed.  The primary unresolved issue centred on the probability of air-born 
pathogens being widely dispersed within a community, in close proximity to a 
primary school and houses. The residents distrusted the engineer’s assurances: they 
knew that in other arenas the instrumentality had been responsible for major public 
health concerns. Also, they are aware that there had been a delay in the delivery of 
promises made to the community.  The residents group proposed alternate solutions: 
each of these would add substantially to costs and lengthen schedule unavoidably 
and, as far as an engineering rationality was concerned, would add nothing in the way 
of technical excellence to the project.   
 
The stakeholder model empowered the community indirectly: if they fail to be 
satisfied, in terms of the way the impact on community is measured as an outcome, 
then the KPIs for community will not achieve outstanding performance, thus 
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threatening the contingency bonus overall for the project. From a project point of 
view the empowerment of community groups as stakeholders had the capacity to 
produce zero-sum power without responsibility.  
 
Underlying the technical claims was a political rationality driven by the importance of 
schedule and cost, despite the new governmental design of the alliance. Traditionally, 
under a business as usual approach, to consider an alternate solution would threaten 
the deadline and the deadline remained the crucial indicator for this particular project, 
driven by the need to be on time for the Olympics.  
 
The community might have succeeded in making technical changes to the project 
that, on the grounds of political expediency; the O-Team would have been politically 
funded to meet.  However, in the aftermath of a State government election that the 
governing party won convincingly, where the communities in question returned 
opposition members, this outcome was always unlikely. More probable was what 
occurred: that the Review of Environmental Factors (REF), conducted by the State 
Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (DUAP), would insist that the local 
community would have to bear the impact of the vents on the environment. The 
community was obliged, however much it might protest, to recognise that there 
seemed no way past the assurances that the engineers offered.  
 
Implications 
From the point of view of the partners in the O-Team, the designer culture through 
which governmentality was arranged was clearly articulated and understood at the 
project HQ level.  At the level of the construction sites it was not as clear that the 
 22 
 
culture was as real, different or tangible.  At the community level, at least in some 
crucial sites, things were even muddier and the culture much less real. What at an 
alliance level looked like admirable flexibility and opportunity for concurrent 
engineering solutions, looked to the community like a conspiracy against their 
interests. These stakeholders, under present arrangements, realized the potentially 
adverse impact that the venting station might have on their property values.  The 
trade-off they faced was between a future, cleaner public amenity as against the 
possibility of foul aromas in the local air and associated health scares – such as 
legionella.  The trade-off seems much less rational than the fear of property values 
declining because of the introduction of something alien into the environment or the 
fear that the community is at risk of bacterial infection. The fear of fumes and 
pathogens is not easily capable of being rationally countered by a probabilistic model 
of what the environmental impact of venting will be.  
 
Where what a community perceives as its real interests in its immediate vicinity can 
be met without alternate trade-offs that threaten future adverse impact, then the 
management of the community impact can be extremely impressive. Everyone can be 
a winner.  But it would seem that in densely settled urban neighbourhoods, where 
such trade-offs cannot be assured, then the O-Team style of governmentality does not 
eliminate zero-sum politics. While positive power largely replaced zero-sum conflicts 
within the designed culture it remained evident in dealings with the external 
community stakeholders.  
 
Governmentality worked well within its remit within the O-Team but it did not easily 
extend beyond it and it was this that undercut it. Zero-sum politics undercut the whole 
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basis of the O-Team governmentality – its monetisation for the contracting parties.  
Such an outcome occurred because the failure to achieve outstanding performance on 
the community KPI threatened the returns that the project management sought to 
secure from the risk/reward scheme. While other KPIs, such as schedule, cost, safety, 
and even environmental impact, remained managerially outcomes focused, the 
community KPIs were more process oriented.  It is in this, perhaps, that the limits of 
alliancing as a governmental strategy may be encountered.  An alliance culture may 
be something that one can engineer but achieving control of a popular culture may be 
that bit harder.  
 
The alliance form of governmentality solved many problems for the O-Team and in 
many respects proved to be an excellent example of liberal governmentality. It sought 
to design, culturally in a common practical consciousness that coordinated actors who 
might otherwise have been contractually committed to being at loggerheads with each 
other. Conflict was largely minimized within the O-Team and between the O-Team 
and site employees.  These actors became subjects of responsibility, autonomy and 
choice. They sought to act upon a common project through shaping and utilising their 
freedom.  On the whole, they did not occupy positions where one organizational actor 
sought to achieve dominance. Instead they tried to construct what Romme (1999) 
refers to as a ‘circularity of power’, where feedback was centralized and authoritative 
power relations tempered by relations of self-determination (Romme, 1999). 
 
Yet this world of harmonious governmentality was not a closed-loop feedback system 
because of the discrepancy between ambition and outcome in the attainment of the 
community KPIs. What are we to make of this failure? One way would be to see an 
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older style of zero-sum realpolitik emerging like a wraith from the rhetoric of the 
community liaison committees, easily recognisable in terms of the emergence of 
familiar adversarial and non-transparent types of politics and discourse. From this 
perspective, it may be concluded that governmentality premised on alliancing offered 
a great deal to construction culture, in highly urban areas, at least, but that there has to 
be some way of translating the interests of empowered stakeholders in the community 
into the responsibilities of the project.  Otherwise, alliancing risks being undercut by 
the very processes that it develops, if it produces a cynical and irresponsible 
empowered set of stakeholders. Of course, this is not a specific problem for alliancing 
but it does test the limits of the O-Team governmental philosophy.  
 
Could community stakeholders have been empowered through granting them some 
governmental status that the O-Team philosophy had denied them? One way, 
perhaps, that this might happen would have been through Councils and other local 
organizations becoming involved in the risk/reward factors, making them financially 
interested stakeholders. Partners such as the O-Team might resource them, precisely 
to investigate alternative rationalities concerning contentious issues, within 
parameters agreed beforehand. Alternatively, they could be given managerial 
representation on the supervisory body overseeing the project, as occurs in some 
countries, such as Sweden, for instance. Ultimately, O-Team type relations could 
have been made more inclusively binding by extending governmentality to agencies 
that were external to the collaboration. However, that would have challenged the 
limits that were designed into this governmental exercise in the first place – as an 




Within the O-Team, some questions can also be raised about the roles of the various 
parties. The overall Project Manager for the O-Team was not from the organization 
that would eventually have responsibility for the project outcomes. If the Project 
Manager had been a senior manager from this organization, the Deputy Project 
Manager might have come from the construction company, and the project initiating 
organization would not have had to bear the impact of being in the firing line as much 
as was the case. Once the project was smoothly underway, and the community-
specific and site-specific grievances dealt with, the roles might have switched. The 
construction expertise could have been put in the hot seat once the issues were more 
technical and less political.  However, in the start-up phase, when the project was 
very political, it might have been better to have someone reporting directly to the 
CEO of the public sector body leading the project. Whatever might be feasible as 
political solutions could only come from this organization because its representatives 
on the project board simply did not have that authority or expertise. Although a 
governmental design was put in place for the alliance it was not one that had 
exclusive sovereignty attached to it: it remained subsidiary to the project initiating 
organization from the public sector. 
 
To the extent that some of these issues – such as the community disquiet about the 
exhaust venting – would have surfaced irrespective of the mode of governance, one 
could say “so what?” However, this would be to underestimate the centrality that 
these issues assumed in both community and project deliberations as well as the 
challenge they posed to the governmental model. While the collective capacity to act 
autonomously – translated into effective capacities for negotiation, decision and 
action – produced partnership, it also produced feedback. In such a partnership, in a 
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quality management context, the discrepancy between ambition and outcome became 
registered through such feedback.  
 
Feedback is essential to constructing a public future perfect (see Wittgenstein, 1972, 
on “public” as opposed to “private” languages). In a world organized by projects 
managing means a permanently shifting future perfect, as more feedback revises the 
here and now, shifting the projections each time. When the future is monetised into 
KPIs that do not represent the interests of every party in the circularity of power, the 
injunction to do better next time is likely to be inherent because of the sense that not 
all stakeholders are equal. Indeed, this is a fundamental challenge for stakeholder 
models – how do they deal with the differential power of stakeholders and maintain 
liberal governmentality? The personal projects and ambitions of individual actors 
who will not, or cannot, become economically rational agents, will not form alliances 
with a future perfect imagined by organization authorities and dominant 
organizations, even as they implement forms of self-determination. Thus, as Morin 
(1984) suggests, the registration of error (or failure) may be a necessary prerequisite 
when organizing through a continuing circularity of power. In fact, the mode of 
governmentality developed requires it: without error nothing would be registered to 
correct or improve – a touchstone of quality management approaches in general.  But 
those stakeholders who cannot be controlled are not so easily governed either.    
 
Conclusion 
Being strategically future perfect in orientation is no guarantee of a perfect future. 
How could it when the here-and-now is constantly shifting, as Schutz (1967) 
understood only too well? But it is not just the temporal element, which Schutz 
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focused on, that is significant, as we have argued. There is also the matter of 
governance by governmentality (Foucault, 1994), which seeks to make the here-and-
now cohere for all participants. The emphasis is on ‘seeks’. As Rose and Miller 
(1992) appreciate:  
We do not live in a governed world so much as a world traversed by the “will to govern”, fuelled 
by the constant registration of “failure”, the discrepancy between ambition and outcome, and the 
constant injunction to do better next time' (Rose and Miller, 1992: 191). 
 
While Rose and Miller (1992) see what one might ascribe as a certain “metaphysical 
pathos” (Gouldner, 1955) in the will to govern one can also see a certain 
organizational logic of action – that of Romme's (1999) notion of a “circularity of 
power’ – as the central ethos of governmentality. The failure of governmental remit 
through some community liaison arenas signified not so much a flawed project of 
participation and empowerment undercut by the recalcitrance of circumstance so 
much as the limits of stakeholder management. Paradoxically, the success of these 
governmental processes is related to their failure: continuous improvement in search 
of excellence requires some failure as feedback to improve.  
 
Moreover, the democratic inclusion of stakeholders and their empowerment – at a 
distance – through KPIs did not signify a fundamental change in an authoritarian 
form. Despite borrowing from the rhetoric and practice of liberal governance such 
organizational projects remained resolutely limited by their formal constituencies. 
Managers and employees of independent organizations that enter an alliance to create 
a common project with a common culture and shared practical consciousness may do 
so successfully. But extending this beyond the limits of corporate – in this case – 
alliance – sovereignty is another matter. While organizations may use governmental 
means to assure their internal sovereignty, they still have to deal with a world of other 
organizations and individuals outside their sovereign realm. . Creating an alliance of 
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contractually committed organizational stakeholders is no mean accomplishment. 
Having done this, they then have to deal with other subjects potentially sovereign in 
their own right.  Some of the community members and organizations clearly fell into 
this category. However, an organizational society of responsible stakeholders remains 
still a distant dream – or, perhaps, with Marcuse (1971) one should one say nightmare 
- of power, rather than something that has yet to be realized. 
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